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COMMENT: FIDUCIARY
RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE
SARBANES-OXLEY DESIGN
Gordon S. Kaiser, Jr.t
I think perhaps because I come from the simple world of private
practice, just a business lawyer, I view some of the issues we've been
talking about a bit more simplistically than Professors Macey' and
Fisch2. I have in response to what they have said, three or major
points. The first issue is the view of Federalism that we've been hear-
ing about, and how Elliot Spitzer's recent activities 3 play into that.
There has been a suggestion that Congress and the SEC will be forced
to respond to Spitzer's activity, particularly as it relates to the regula-
tion of the financial services industry and capital markets industry. In
a sense, I think that the congressional and SEC response so far
amounts to the tail wagging the dog. What is going on with Mr.
Spitzer is an interesting phenomenon, and he certainly has had sig-
nificant impact on the financial services industry. But, that is not the
corporate governance movement that I deal with day-to-day. That is
not what has been affecting board rooms of publicly held companies.
The closest Elliot Spitzer has gotten to board governance has been his
activity regarding the compensation package for Dick Grasso, the
former head of the New York Stock Exchange, as Professor Fisch
pointed out, in order to address that issue, Spitzer had to reach to the
fiduciary duties outlined in the criminal sections of the nonprofit cor-
t Partner, Squire, Sanders & Dempsey L.L.P., Cleveland, OH, J.D., Case Western Re-
serve University School of Law; B.A., Baldwin-Wallace College. The views expressed in this
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poration statute. These are principles that simply are not applicable to
day-to-day corporate life.
Mr. Spitzer has not tried to attack in any significant way the corpo-
rate governance issues that Sarbanes-Oxley 4 addresses. Sarbanes-
Oxley is a congressional and federal reaction to the failure of states to
effectively implement a watchdog mechanism on management of the
publicly held companies. The problems that gave rise to Enron, Adel-
phia, Tyco, Worldcom, and all the rest, were the result of a failure by
watchdogs, the checks on management, that the investment commu-
nity and the public were in place.
Those watchdogs certainly included boards of directors. Boards of
directors were governed in that watchdog function, primarily-maybe
even exclusively-by fiduciary duty relationships that arise from state
law. The watchdogs' fiduciary duty really didn't derive, in any sig-
nificant way from the federal securities laws. In fact, Congress had
established pretty clearly that the federal securities laws were to be
limited to disclosure-related issues prior to Sarbanes-Oxley.
While it's true that Commissioner Campos certainly discussed cor-
porate governance,5 he also tried to color that discussion in terms of
supporting additional disclosure activity. What he said was that, in
putting out regulations that relate to how corporations act internally,
the SEC and Congress were attempting to further or to improve finan-
cial disclosure. I do not think improved disclosure is the primary
motivator for the federal legislature and regulatory activity we have
seen since 2002. I do not think that is what Sarbanes is primarily
about.
Sarbanes-Oxley really represents a huge step, a watershed event, in
terms of the federalization of corporate law. It is akin to what hap-
pened to regulation of the capital markets in the 1930s, with the pas-
sage of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. In the same way that those Acts
ultimately overpowered the state regulation, state takeover laws not-
withstanding. Sarbanes-Oxley is the first step in what will be, for
publicly held companies, the federalization of corporate governance
principles in general. While that can be scary to people who still be-
lieve in states' rights, or who perhaps, more accurately, like the con-
trol they have over state legislatures; I, for one, think Sarbanes-Oxley
is probably a good thing.
That leads me to my second point. The title of this symposium is
"Directors Versus Shareholders." I think this is an inappropriate jux-
4 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 STAT. 745 (2002).
5 Roel C. Campos, Remarks of SEC Commissioner Roel C. Campos, 55 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 527 (2005).
[Vol. 55:3
2005] FIDUCIARY RESP. UNDER THE SARBANES-OXLEY DESIGN 629
taposition. I do not believe that the primary tension is between direc-
tors and shareholders; I think that the focus of governance activity is
on the tension between a number of different groups and manage-
ment. One of the main goals of Sarbanes-Oxley, one would hope, is a
better alignment between director interest and shareholder interest, as
well as a better alignment between the interests of some other con-
stituents, including professional advisors, the regulatory authorities,
and shareholders. In that sense, there really isn't an increased tension
between directors and shareholders, but rather a more closely aligned
interest between them.
The key to this greater alignment of interests lies in trying to find
ways for management, directors, and professional advisors to publicly
held companies to be more effectively held accountable for the fidu-
ciary responsibilities they each have.
I do not think that anything we have talked about has really
changed the fundamental fiduciary responsibility of each of those
parties. Instead, the question should be focused on how we go about
enforcing those fiduciary responsibilities. What kind of checks and
balances do we have in place that will ensure those fundamental fidu-
ciary duties are working?
Sarbanes-Oxley did a lot to increase accountability, at least from
the standpoint of the directors and the accounting world. Perhaps
more importantly, Sarbanes-Oxley also increased what directors and
the accounting world perceived to be their accountability.
For accountants, the perception is also the reality. They need look
no further than Arthur Anderson for a very unpleasant example of
how accountable they can be held in the marketplace for failure to act
in appropriate ways.
The directors, are also taking their responsibilities very seriously.
While it may have been true in many corporations ten years ago or
even five years ago that some, or maybe even a fair number of boards
and directors, viewed themselves as very much aligned, or even the
handmaidens of management; that is not the way boards of directors
are looking at it today.
I have seen a real change in every board room I have been in dur-
ing the last two years. I advise a number of boards of publicly held
companies, and I talk to a lot of other board members. Directors are
taking their roles much more seriously from a variety of standpoints.
While all of the principles encompassed in the new regulatory
framework adopted by the stock exchanges and embodied in Sar-
banes-Oxley, have had significant impact. Two of the changes have
had particularly strong impact on how some boards operate. The first
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one, which resulted in perhaps the biggest single change I saw in sev-
eral boards, is the stock exchange requirement that boards meet on a
regular basis in an executive session-that is, meeting without the
CEO in the room. This requirement goes in part to the question of
whether or not boards really are under the thumb of management or
the CEO, and whether they can continue to stay that way. Most of the
boards I work with actually hold executive sessions at every meeting.
This practice has had a tremendous impact on how they communicate
with one another and what they focus on as major issues: very bright,
very well-meaning, very good directors behave differently when the
CEO is in the room than they do when he or she is not there.
The other requirement I want to touch on concerns the requirement
that the nomination committee be comprised of all independent direc-
tors. For some companies, this was a major change because if they
had a nomination committee, it was frequently one that didn't act in a
truly independent fashion. I believe that the combination of the per-
ceived sense of director accountability in the performance of fiduciary
duties and the responsibility for the nomination process in an execu-
tive session context will ultimately have a significant impact on how
directors behave in the nomination process.
It will not be easy for any CEO under these circumstances to have
an effective across-the-board control of the nomination process. Even
if you have a CEO that shareholders believe is doing a good job and
performing well, the nomination process will come down to who
comprises the nomination committee. Directors will listen to the
CEO, and while they may not listen or heed the CEO's advice all the
time, it is going to be an important factor, when he or she has a nomi-
nee. However, selection of director nominees ultimately will depend
on whether the committee feels that the CEO's nominee is a person
the directors can work with, and whether the committee believes that
the addition or maintenance of that person is going to be disruptive to
the company.
The last point I want to make has to do with some of the other con-
stituencies that failed in the watchdog role. In the scandals that came
out of the late 1990s, many constituencies other than directors and
accountants failed at least by omission, if not commission. Those
constituencies include professional advisors other than accountants,
and particularly includes lawyers.
The SEC has backed away somewhat from some of the harsher
penalties and rules proposed for lawyers. I do not think that they have
quite figured out who should be held responsible. To be honest, I
have not figured it out either. However, what I do know is that, in
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virtually every one of the major failures-Enron and Adelphia, for
example-there were lawyers in the room. All of these companies
had general counsel. They had outside law firms involved in a lot of
their transactions, and in many cases, outside counsel came from very
reputable firms. These were not cases of companies being advised by
people who were not experienced or qualified practitioners. Yet,
there was still a failure of the process. It might not have been as di-
rect a failure as the accounting profession engaged in, but it was a
failure nonetheless.
Lawyers are not the only ones who have yet to catch the real focus
of legislative and regulatory change. I suspect that eventually, the
focus will be more on lawyers, financial advisors, and some of the
financial institutions that participated in those transactions.
I wish I had a good solution to the legal problems. I think that the
noisy withdrawal plan of the SEC did more damage than good in
terms of ensuring the fidelity of the relationship with our clients. I do
not think you can be a good counselor if the essential basis of your
relationship with your client is fear. That simply does not work.
There must be another solution for this problem, and I believe that it
is imperative that we find it sooner rather than later.

